1. All thinkers generally subscribe to the 67% internally consistent wave-function of "thinking" -- that which is thought, the thinker, and the thunk contribute to the thinking wave function in a feedback pattern that tends to sublimate the thinker into the thought and the thunk without undo discrimination, to mnake possible the surrealistic illusion that "you" are thinking some "thing."
2. All thought-patterns in known cheese-space generally subscribe to the fiction of the "knowable" -- i.e., that whihc is thunk/thought/ or "known" through hegemonically pre-assigned sign-sytems, of which you are a part.  It is generally the case that you are not what you think you are, insofar as thinking makes you other than "you."  The ideological predisposition of your thoughts are known to you through your absinthe (metaclarital) octave pattern, that which does not subscribe to any known pattern save for what the Romantics called the divine, i.e., the sublimated consciousness of an Other not known to follow any live patterns of embedded/embodied consciousness.
3. Insofar as "you" are in the mode of "objection" to the preceding sign-system's ideological awareness / sign-base and choose to "reject" its oppositional narrrative of white/black either/or in favor of a meta-nodal disjunction whereby the known and the unknown can be merged, "you" should know that the di-stream consciousness dictator which we have tended to isolate under ideal conditions in the form of "radicalism" is a generally-consistent wave-fucntion that tends to result in the premature death of the "thinker" of this wave-function.  That is, you are welcome to embrace disjunctive temporary solipsism in the hope of finding/making more palatable sign-systems, but the degree of acceptibility / interoperability of your sign-system using awareness will tend to be less permeable the further you travel from the "meta-narrative."
4. In the event you have dictated this path due to ignorance of the particular signs involved -- i.e., is "fun-having" any more or less signifcant or veiled with meaning than "having fun" and is a "fun-haver" the same as someone who has fun?  Certainly we avail ourselves when possible to clarift the usage of our terms here if thew difficulty of your meta-nodal / reactionary consciousness in its particualr junctures at this moment is primary due to the inherent ambiguities in our usage as previously deswcribed.  Certaintly, in the event, we can point out that having fun gernreally doesn ot invovle having much of anything, but is rahter experiencing fun, allowing yourself to be swung and aped by its bio-statis enegies in the interests of releiving stress, etc.  The "fun-haver" on the other hand, must by inordinaately placiong himself out of this feedback loop, opposiiontally position himse/fherslef/itself in the paradoixal position of iwhsing to "own" fun, to possess it as you would an object.  We shoudlk note too that the partocialr referent-module attachable to this "fun-havewr" sign does not yert have a generally- consistent wave-fuction it can be describd weith.  There are, however, several intriguing possibilites that can further calrify the potential applicaiblity of this model.
5. For the dictorially-aligned consciousnessated selfhood, i.e., "you," if "you" is the generally stable meta-nodal wavepoint that tneds most often to align itself with "proximity to power" and "regernation of the self" and "eternity" and "meteroic rise to godhood," the illusion of the ownability of fun can be your styx-matrix in the event of consciousness meltdown in your subjects, -- i.e., the opromise of "fun," as a deliberable product, may termporarily assuage some of the more grievous effects of being controlled by your dictatorial consiousness.
6. For the amiguated consiousness entity that does not wish to ascribe unamgiguiosly to either "having as possessing" or "having as experiencing" fun, we may posit that the "fun-haver" is one who both contributes to an awareness of the inapproapiteness of the possessvie verb "to have" in this experiential idiom, and who enjoys "having" fun, whatever "having" might mean in this context.  Further, we might posit , that the "have" here can mean "tending to relate to a partiocualr mode of being" and is thus allied with the idea that you "have" dreams or that you "have hunger" -- while these are instead states of being that you experience, of course, insofar as "you" and "states of being" are generaly consistent wave-fucntions, etc.  In this case, you can clearly answer in the affirmative if you willing to posit yourself insittually between the two alliances of our have-posseiove- poarallel paradox, positonally speaking.
7. For the grecian-urn reader of Keats, i.e., thinker/thought.known complex of "I" who might tend in the idela cirucmstances to view the thought process itself and the mboided process of being "happy" with the xpericne of "fun" invovle,d you may be said toi have "indivuadted" your "existrial prirooty systme" when you can contempalte the "meaninglessness" of your "having" anything knwon by an experiential term , ie. "fun", while simultaneously allying yourself wit hte fleeting tnatuero fe pience, and in which case you must then itonically positiojn yourself as a grabber after known constants -- ie. -- the termproary realm of erxperince is all that is "known" and is hence all that canb be "had" or "experinced" and so the inapplicaibltiy of the sign-system model "having" only underlienes the inoperbility of your langured consicounsess in thsi universe, wiht all ironcil disposiotn you mgiht take thereof.  In this case, yes is definitely your preferred answer, and many priaes be sung in your honor.  Ahllejuluah, bonker, bonkers, aloaha.