National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)

NIAC Pandemic Working Group

Initial Findings October 10, 2006

Martha H. Marsh Chairman and CEO Clinics

Chief Rebecca F. Denlinger Fire Chief Stanford Hospital and Cobb County, GA Fire and Rescue

Bruce Rohde Chairman and CEO **Emeritus** ConAgra Foods, Inc.

Questions from DHS/HHS

- Six specific pandemic questions
 - Identify and define critical services that must be maintained in a pandemic;
 - Establish criteria and principles for critical service prioritization;
 - Define critical services priority;
 - Identify critical employee groups in each priority critical service;
 - Build a structure for communication and dissemination of resources; and
 - Identify principles for effective implementation by DHS and HHS.

Assumptions

- Susceptibility to pandemic influenza virus will be universal.
- □ The clinical disease attack rate will be 30% in the overall population during the pandemic. Among working adults, an average of 20% will become ill from the pandemic influenza.
- Absenteeism may be as high as 40% during peak pandemic periods.
 - Absenteeism will include those who are ill or "think" they are ill with pandemic influenza
 - Absenteeism will include those who stay at home for care of family members
 - Well parents opting to remain at home to care for sick child/spouse are considered absent
 - Those who stay at home to telework are not considered absent
- Some persons will become sick from the pandemic influenza but not develop clinically significant symptoms. These persons can transmit pandemic influenza and develop immunity.
- □ Multiple waves of illness are expected with each wave expected to last two to three months in duration.
- Each wave during its peak will adversely impact infected communities for six to eight weeks.
- Effectively half of all infected will seek medical care.

3


Identifying Critical Goods and Services and Establishing Prioritization Criteria


- □ Critical goods and services are:
 - Essential elements of national security and homeland security
 - Components of systems, assets, and industries upon which our economy depends
 - Components of systems, assets, and industries upon which public health depends
 - Fundamental to the 85% of the critical infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector
 - Further defined by high rates of inter-dependency amongst critical infrastructure or single points of failure

Establishing criteria and principles for critical service prioritization

- ☐ Critical goods/services required to maintain national or homeland security
 - For example: Water, energy, food, banking & finance, chemical, healthcare, Fire/EMS, communications, transportation, law enforcement, etc.
- ☐ Critical goods/services to ensure economic survival
 - For example: Banking & Finance, communications, IT, transportation, electricity
- $\hfill \square$ Critical goods/services to maintain public health and welfare
 - For example: Water, energy, food and agriculture, healthcare, Fire/EMS, law enforcement, etc.
- □ Critical goods/services with *significant number of inter-dependencies*
 - For example: Water, electricity, food and agriculture, etc.

.






Identifying Critical Employee Groups: All Sectors, Tier 1 Only

Critical Employees: Tier 1 Only

- Banking & Finance: Proprietary
 Chemical: 373,000
- Commercial Facilities: 179,600
- Communications: 396,097
- Emergency Services: 3,708,592 Electricity: 5,000
- Food and Agriculture: 1,363000
- Healthcare: 8,048,059Information Technology: 692,800
- Nuclear: 86,000
- Oil and Natural Gas: 208,000 • Postal and Shipping: 71,000
- Transportation: 2,786,000
- Water and Wastewater: 607,000



TOTAL: 18,526,148

- Numbers include Tier 1 "essential" employees only.
- Does not include numbers of critical workers from the Wholesale Clearing and Settlement Services sub-sector. The Treasury Department will provide DHS with these proprietary numbers.
- State and local government numbers removed from gross and priority workforce numbers.

Initial Recommendations

Building a Structure for Communication and Dissemination of Resources

Communications

- Pre-define, to the greatest extent possible, a consistent pandemic communications plan covering the entire pandemic episode; tailor communications to specific target audiences.
- Develop and pre-position, to the greatest extent possible, communications in all distribution channels, including radio, television, telephone, print, and online media.
- Engage the private sector to augment the distribution of communications to the critical workforce; rehearse communication.
- Refine communications plans, processes, and success metrics through series of response exercises.

Initial Recommendations

Building a Structure for Communication and Dissemination of Resources

Dissemination

- Continue developing a clearly defined vaccine/anti-viral distribution strategy.
 - Consider alternative distribution strategies and guidance that allows the private sector to distribute vaccine and anti-virals to in-scope critical workforce.
- Clearly define response and containment roles and responsibilities.
 - Better define response timelines and milestones.
- Continue to educate all stakeholders on plans, process, and priorities.
- Develop mechanism to clearly identify priority workforce groups.
- Engage appropriate resources to ensure adherence to distribution strategy and the economical use of limited vaccine and anti-viral resources.
 - □ Identify, collect and report success metrics.

Q

Initial Recommendations

Identifying Principles for Effective Implementation by DHS and HHS

■ Pillar #1: Preparedness and Communication

- Clearly align preparedness and response plans, communications, exercises, investments, and support activities around sustaining critical workforce during pandemic influenza event.
 - $\hfill\Box$ Continue data gathering, analysis, reporting, and open review.
 - More clearly define roles and responsibilities across all stakeholders in both public and private sectors.
 - □ Continue to develop and refine preparedness and response plans.
 - Continue to engage private sector in public sector planning and responses exercises.

Initial Recommendations

Identifying Principles for Effective Implementation by DHS and HHS

■ Pillar #2: Surveillance and Detection

- Better engage key elements of the private sector in proactive surveillance and monitoring activities, including:
 - Extend surveillance to include occupational health professionals;
 - Engage international components of US corporations in global bio-data collection efforts;
 - Supplement surveillance technology investments, acquisition, monitoring and response, to increase threat visibility and geographic coverage; and
 - Engage non-traditional data acquisition and management resources within the commercial workforce in surveillance, collection, and analysis.

11

Initial Recommendations

Identifying Principles for Effective Implementation by DHS and HHS

☐ Pillar #3: Response and Containment

- Develop clearly-defined vaccine and anti-viral distribution strategy to ensure deployment as planned.
 - Consider alternative distribution methods that engage private sector in directly distributing to in-scope critical workforce.
- Clearly define response and containment roles and responsibilities.
 - Better define response timelines and milestones.
- Educate all stakeholders on plans, process, and priorities.
- Develop mechanism to clearly identify priority workforce groups.
- Engage appropriate resources to ensure adherence to distribution strategy and the economical use of limited vaccine and anti-viral resources.
 - Identify, collect and report success metrics.

NOTE: Recommendations parallel Question #5, part-2, "Dissemination of Resources."

Additional Questions to Consider

- Foreign workers and the U.S Critical Infrastructure (CI):
 - Study to what extent do we address international foreign workers who are central to U.S. CI operations
- Government willingness to underwrite key components of financial infrastructure:
 - Research and report on the potential impact on gross numbers in critical priority groups across multiple sectors when government underwrites some transactions
- Competing strategies on priorities:
 - Address key metropolitan areas versus key components of critical infrastructure
 - Address at-risk populations versus critical good/service producers
- Contract resources and FTE's:
 - Recognize that significant numbers of contract resources identified as critical to sustained operations (e.g. ATM provisioning, Nuclear temp labor, etc.) not accounted for in current study

13

Additional Questions to Consider (cont.)

- Regulatory relief:
 - Study potential for relief from some regulatory burdens and potential decrease number of workers identified in Tier-1
- Family member impact:
 - Continue to investigate family member care, containment impact on the critical worker and economical/efficient use of limited vaccine/anti-viral supplies
- High potential that some resources are double-counted, for example public/private/volunteer EMS; non-practicing MDs; and Federal, State, county, city, and contract law enforcement, etc.
- Impact of potential containment strategies (e.g. closing of U.S. borders or closing of state borders) on organizations and their operations?
 - Workforce management, transportation, etc.

Final Thoughts

- Existing Federal and State plan priorities include:
 - Vaccine and anti-viral manufacturing
 - High-risk persons
 - □ Over 65 with 1 or more high risk conditions
 - □ 6 months to 65 years with 2 or more high risk conditions
 - Persons 6 months and older with history of hospitalization for flu
 - Pregnant women
 - Household contacts with severely immuno-depressed persons without vaccination
 - Household contact with children younger than 6 months
 - Public health emergency workers
 - Key government leaders
 - Healthy people over 65 years
 - 6 months to 65 years with 1 high risk condition

15

Final Thoughts (cont.)

- NIAC prioritization focus differs from existing plans. Focus on:
 - Maintain national and homeland security
 - Ensure economic survival
 - Maintain public health and welfare
 - Identify and address critical inter-dependencies and single points of failure
- Suggest that resolution method be developed to determine:
 - Federal/state prioritization method priority vs. NIAC recommended priority
 - Distribution methods: direct to private sector vs. direct to public sector
 - Further refinement of critical worker definitions, priorities, and numbers
- Forum be developed to identify, quantify, and qualify potential prioritization and distribution methods and channels