Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Commonwealth

THE COMMON

“By “the common” we mean, first of all, the common wealth of the material world—the air, the water, the fruits of the soil, and all nature’s bounty—which in classic European political texts is often claimed to be the inheritance of humanity as a whole, to be shared together. We consider the commons also and more significantly those results of social production that are necessary for social interaction and further production, such as knowledges, languages, codes, information, affects, and so forth. This notion of the common does not position humanity separate from nature, as either its exploiter or its custodian, but focuses rather on the practices of interaction, care, and cohabitation in a common world, promoting the beneficial and limiting the detrimental forms of the common. In the era of globalization, issues of the maintenance, production, and distribution of the common in both these senses and in both ecological and socioeconomic frameworks become increasingly central.” Viii

NEOLIBERAL ENCLOSURE

“Neoliberal government policies throughout the world have sought in recent decades to privatize the common, making cultural products—for example, information, ideas, and even species of animals and plants—into private property. We argue, in chorus with many others, that such privatization should be resisted. The standard view, however, assumes that the only alternative to the private is the public, that is, what is managed and regulated by states and other governmental authorities, as if the common were irrelevant or extinct.” Viii

THE COMMON

“And yet so much of our world is common, open to access of all and developed through active participation. Language, for example, like affects and gestures, is for the most part common, and indeed if language were made either private or public—that is, if large portions of our words, phrases, or parts of speech were subject to private ownership or public authority—then language would lose its powers of expression, creativity, and communication.” Ix

COMMONS IS NOT PUBLIC OR PRIVATE—THIS IS A FALSE DISTINCTION

“The seemingly exclusive alternative between the private and the public corresponds to an equally pernicious political alternative between capitalism and socialism. It is often assumed that the only cure for the ills of capitalist society is public regulation and Keynesian and/or socialist economic management; and, conversely, socialist maladies are presumed to be treatable only by private property and capitalist control. Socialism and capitalism, however, even though they have at times been mingled together and at others occasioned bitter conflicts, are both regimes of property that exclude the common. The political project of instituting the common, which we develop in this book, cuts diagonally across these false alternatives—neither private nor public, neither capitalist nor socialist—and opens a new space for politics.” Ix

COMMONS IS A PARADOX FOR CAPITAL—INTERNET TECHNOLOGY DEEPENS THE PARADOX

“Contemporary forms of capitalist production and accumulation in fact, despite their continuing drive to privatize resources and wealth, paradoxically make possible and even require expansions of the common.” Ix

“In the newly dominant forms of production that involve information, codes, knowledge, images, and affects, for example, producers increasingly require a high degree of freedom as well as open access to the common, especially in its social forms, such as communications networks, information banks, and cultural circuits. Innovation in Internet technologies, for example, depends directly on access to common code and information resources as well as the ability to connect and interact with others in unrestricted networks. And more generally, all forms of production in decentralized networks, whether or not computer technologies are involved, demand freedom and access to the common. Furthermore the content of what is produced—including ideas, images, and affects—is easily reproduced and thus tends toward being common, strongly resisting all legal and economic efforts to privatize it or bring it under public control.” X

DISPOSITIF

“…Michel Foucault’s notion of the *dispositive* (the material, social, affective, and cognitive mechanisms or apparatuses of the production of subjectivity)…” x

COMMONWEALTH

“With the title of this book, *Commonwealth*, we mean to indicate a return to some of the themes of classic treaties of government, exploring the institutional structure and political constitution of society. We also want to emphasize, once we recognize the relation between the two terms that compose this concept, the need to institute and manage a world of common wealth, focusing on and expanding our capacities for collective production and self-government.” Xiii

LAW FUNCTIONS TO EMBED POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUAL IN TRANSCENDENTAL LEGAL FORMALISM

“Property, which is taken to be intrinsic to human thought and action, serves as the regulative idea of the constitutional state and the rule of law. This is not really a historical foundation but rather an ethical obligation, a constitutive form of the moral order. The concept of the individual is defined by not *being* but *having*; rather than to a “deep” metaphysical and transcendental unity, in other words, it refers to a “superficial” entity endowed with property or possessions, defined increasingly today in “patrimonial” terms as a shareholder. In effect, through the concept of the individual, the transcendent figure of the legitimation of property is integrated into the transcendental formalism of legality.” 7

CAPITALISM AS ITS OWN FORM OF LAW

“Capital too functions as an impersonal form of domination that imposes laws of its own, economic laws that structure social life and make hierarchies and subordinations seem natural and necessary. The basic elements of capitalist society—the power of property concentrated in the hands of the few, the need for the majority to sell their labor-power to maintain themselves, the exclusion of large portions of the global population even from these circuits of exploitation, and so forth—all function as an a priori. It is even difficult to recognize this as violence because it is so normalized and its force is applied so impersonally. Capitalist control and exploitation rely primarily not on an external sovereign power but on invisible, internalized laws.” 7

REPUBLICANISM 8

THERE WERE MANY NOTIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTED REPUBLICANISM—THE VERSION THAT WON OUT CENTERED ON THE INVIOLABILITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS—HARDT AND NEGRI REFER TO THIS AS “THE REPUBLIC OF PROPERTY” 9

ANSWERING CHARLES BEARD’S CRITICS

“Many scholars have contested Beard’s claim that the founders in drafting the Constitution were protecting their own individual economic interests and wealth, but what remains unchallenged and entirely convincing in his analysis is that the participants in the debate saw the Constitution as founded on economic interests and the rights of property.” 10

“The sacred position of property in the Constitution is a central obstacle to the practice and development of constituent power.” 10

MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN CAPITAL AND LAW

“The relationship between capital and law defines a paradoxical power structure that is at once extraordinarily abstract and entirely concrete. On the one hand, legal structures are abstract representations of social reality, relatively indifferent to social contents, and on the other, capitalist property defines the concrete conditions of the exploitation of labor. Both are totalizing social frameworks, extending across the entire social space, working in coordination and holding together, so to speak, the abstract and concrete planes. Marx adds to this paradoxical synthesis of the abstract and the concrete the recognition that labor is the positive content of private property.” 22

“Private property in its capitalist form thus produces a relation of exploitation in its fullest sense—the production of the human as commodity—and excludes from view the materiality of human needs and poverty.” 23

HEGEMONY OF IMMATERIALIST LABOR MEANS THE SEPARATION OF LABOR POWER FROM THE CONTROL OF CAPITAL

“Living labor oriented toward producing immaterial goods, such as cognitive or intellectual labor, always exceeds the bounds set on it and poses forms of desire that are not consumed and forms of life that accumulate. When immaterial production becomes hegemonic, all the elements of the capitalist process have to be viewed in a new light, sometimes in terms completely inverted from the traditional analyses of historical materialism. What was called “the transition from capitalism to communism” takes the form of a process of liberation in practice, the constitution of a new world.” 25

THE EXPANSION OF STRUGGLE—FROM PRODUCTION TO REPRODUCTION

“The fundamental genealogy no doubt follows the development of workers’ struggles inside and outside the factories, moving from salary demands and thus extending the terrain of struggle and analysis to reach all corners of social life. The dynamic of struggles is not only antagonistic but also constructive or, better, constituent, interpreting a new era of political economy and proposing within it new alternatives.” 26

FOUCAULT, BIOPOWER, AND MARXISM—HARDT AND NEGRI DO NOT SEE A BETRAYAL OF MARXISM

“When he insists that there is no central, transcendent locus of power but only a myriad of micropowers that are exercised in capillary forms across the surfaces of bodies in their practices and disciplinary regimes, many commentators object that he is betraying the Marxist tradition (and Foucault himself contributes to this impression). In our view, though, Foucault’s analyses of bodies and power in this phase of his work, following a line initiated by Merleau-Ponty, really make good on some of the intuitions that the young Marx could not completely grasp about the need to bring the critique of property, along with all the transcendental structures of capitalist society, back to the phenomenology of bodies. Foucault adopts many disguises—*larvatus prodeo—*in his relationship with Marxism, but that relationship is nonetheless extremely profound.” 31

BIOPOWER AND RESISTANCE—NOT DOMINATION BUT ANTAGONISM AND GROUP STRUGGLE—PRODUCTIVE BODIES (SUBJECTIVITY)

“Its first axiom is that bodies are the constitutive components of the biopolitical fabric of being. On the biopolitical terrain—this is the second axiom—where powers are continually made and unmade, bodies resist. They have to resist in order to exist. History cannot therefore be understood merely as the horizon on which biopower configures reality through domination. On the contrary, history is determined by the biopolitical antagonisms and resistances to biopower. The third axiom of his research agenda is that corporeal resistance produces subjectivity, not in an isolated or independent way but in the complex dynamic with the resistances of other bodies. This production of subjectivity through resistance and struggle will prove central, as our analysis proceeds, not only to the subversion of the existing forms of power but also to the constitution of alternative institutions of liberation.” 31

PRODUCTIVITY OF BODIES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF BEING FROM BELOW 32

PROPERTY PRODUCES SUBJECTIVITIES—MULTITUDE AND RESISTANCE

“Private property creates subjectivities that are at once individual (in their competition with one another) and unified as a class to preserve their property (against the poor). The constitutions of the great modern bourgeois republics mediate this balance between individualism and class interests of property. The poverty of the multitude, then, seen from this perspective, does not refer to its misery or deprivation or even its lack, but instead names a production of social subjectivity that results in a radically plural and open body politic, opposed to both the individualism and the exclusive, unified social body of property. The poor, in other words, refers not to those who have nothing but to the wide multiplicity of all those who are inserted in the mechanisms of social production regardless of social order or property. And this conceptual conflict is also a political conflict. Its productivity is what makes the multitude of the poor a real and effective menace for the republic of property.” 40

RELATION OF POVERTY TO THE MULTITUDE 40

MULTITUDE IS A THREAT TO PROPERTY—HYDRA (PIRATE) ANALOGY

“And at sea, of course, the multitude populates the maritime circuits of production and trade, as well as the pirate networks that prey on them. The negative image is in this case, too, the one most strongly conveyed to us: the multitude is a many-headed hydra that threatens property and order. Part of the threat of this multitude is its multiplicity, composed at times of combinations of sailors, maroons, servants, soldiers, tradesmen, laborers, renegades, castaways, pirates, and numerous others circulating through the great oceans. The threat is also, though, that this multitude will undermine property and its structures of rule. When men of power and property warn about the dangerous hydra loose in the seas, they are not telling fairy tales but trying to grasp and neutralize a real and powerful political threat.” 44

“By its very existence the multitude of the poor presents an objective menace to the republic of property.” 45

POOR ARE A THREAT TO PROPERTY

“What stands behind the hatred of the poor in its different forms is fear, since the poor constitute a direct threat to property—not only because they lack wealth and might even be justified in stealing it, like the nobles Jean Valjean, but also because they have the power to undermine and overthrow the republic of property.” 45

FOUCAULT AND BIOPOWER: RESISTANCE OR COUNTERPOWER

“He devotes most of his attention to disciplinary regimes, architectures of power, and the applications of power through distributed and capillary networks, a power that does not so much repress as produce subjects. Throughout these books, however, sometimes in what seem like asides or marginal notes, Foucault also constantly theorizes an other to power (or even an other power), for which he seems unable to find an adequate name. Resistance is the term he most often uses, but it does not really capture what he has in mind, since resistance, as it is generally understood, is too dependent on and subordinate to the power it opposes. One might suggest to Foucault the Marxist notion of “counterpower,” but that term implies a second power that is homologous to the one it opposes. In our view, the other to power that runs through these books is best defined as an alternative production of subjectivity, which not only resists power but also seeks autonomy from it.” 56

FOUCAULT AND DOUBLENESS OF POWER—TERMINOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN BIOPOWER AND BIOPOLITICS

“Here too Foucault’s attention is focused primarily on the power over life—or, really, the power to administer and produce life—that functions through the government of populations, managing their health, reproductive capacities, and so forth. But there is always a minor current that insists on life as resistance, an other power of life that strives toward an alternative existence. The perspective of resistance makes clear the difference between these two powers: the biopower against which we struggle is not comparable in its nature or form to the power of life by which we defend and seek our freedom. To mark this difference between the two “powers of life,” we adopt a terminological distinction, suggested by Foucault’s writings but not used consistently by him, between biopower and biopolitics, whereby the former could be defined (rather crudely) as the power over life and the latter as the power of life to resist and determine an alternative production of subjectivity.” 57

HARDT AND NEGRI ON BIOPOLITICS

“Our reading not only identifies biopolitics with the localized productive powers of life—that is, the production of affects and languages through social cooperation and the interaction of bodies and desires, the invention of new forms of the relation to the self and others, and so forth—but also affirms biopolitics as the creation of new subjectivities that are presented at once as resistance and de-subjectification. If we remain too closely tied to a philological analysis of Foucault’s texts, we might miss this central point: his analyses of biopower are aimed not merely at an empirical description of how power works for and through subjects but also at the potential for the production of alternative subjectivities, thus designating a distinction between qualitatively different forms of power. This point is implicit in Foucault’s claim that freedom and resistance are necessary preconditions for the exercise of power.” 58-59

“Biopolitics, in contrast to biopower, has the character of an *event* first of all in the sense that the “intransigence of freedom” disrupts the normative system. The biopolitical event comes from the outside insofar as it ruptures the continuity of history and the existing order, but it should be understood not only negatively, as rupture, but also as innovation, which emerges, so to speak, from the inside. Foucault grasps the creative character of the event in his earlier work on linguistics: *la parole* intervenes in and disrupts *la langue* as an event that also extends beyond it as a moment of linguistic invention. For the biopolitical context, though, we need to understand the event on not only the linguistic and epistemological but also the anthropological and ontological terrain, as an act of freedom. In this context the event marked by the innovative disruption of *la parole* beyond *la langue* translates to an intervention in the field of subjectivity, with its accumulation of norms and modes of life, by a force of subjectification, a new production of subjectivity.” 59

MUST STOP ASSUMING DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE ARE EXTERNAL TO EACH OTHER 70

SLAVERY AS A LIMIT CASE TO FOUCAULT’S NOTION OF POWER AND RESISTANCE

“When the slave is conceived as an abstract category, it is often posed as a figure of absolute subjugation, a subject that has been entirely stripped of freedom. Slaves thus present a useful limit case for Foucault’s claim, cited earlier, that power is exercised only over free subjects. If slaves were indeed under absolute domination, there would be no power exercised over them, according to Foucault. It sounds contradictory, of course, to claim that slaves are free. Foucault’s point is that all subjects have access to a margin of freedom, no matter how narrow that may be, which grounds their capacity to *resist*. To say that power is exercised only over “free subjects,” then, really means that power is exercised only over subjects that resist, subjects that even prior to the application of power exercise their freedom. Slaves are most free, from this perspective, not from sundown to sunup, when out of reach of the master’s whip, but when they resist the exercise of power over them. Baruch Spinoza makes a similar claim and anchors it to an ontological foundation: “Nobody can so completely transfer to another all his right, and consequently his power, as to cease to be a human being, nor will there ever be a sovereign power that can do all it pleases.” Slave resistance pushes to the limit the relation between poverty and power exercised as freedom.” 75

THIS LIMIT CASE EXPOSES THE IMPORTANCE OF SLAVE REVOLT AND RESISTANCE

“In historical terms this reflection illuminates the decisive role played by slave revolts, rebellions, and exoduses. Slavery is overturned not be the good conscience of republican values, as if it were just a premodern remained; nor by the progressive forces of capital, as if it were a precapitalist form that took time for capital to eliminate entirely. Instead slavery is destroyed by the resistances of slaves themselves, who make it untenable as a form of government and unprofitable as a form of production.” 75-76

RESISTANCE INTERNAL TO CAPITALIST DOMINATION AND HAS EXPLANATORY POWER IN UNDERSTANDING THE TRAJECTORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

“Similar phenomena can be found in the second wave of servitude and slavery in eastern Europe that stretches from the seventeenth-century restoration of feudal relations, following the wars of religion, to the birth of the nation-state. Both Marx and Max Weber focus on this history, not only because it breaks with the deterministic theory of stages of development of the mode of production—workers in eastern Europe, after a phase of relative liberalization of their movements, are reduced again to servitude *within* the processes of the formation of the capitalist mode of production—but also because it shows how, already in the preindustrial period, the mobility and freedom of labor-power constitutes a power of resistance and antagonism that capital cannot tolerate. In fact these forms of servitude are eventually destroyed, in part, by the flight of peasants toward the metropolises of western Europe. Through exodus, the antagonism of the servant with respect to the lord is transformed into the “abstract,” objective antagonism of the working class in the face of the capitalist class. The point once again is that even in circumstances of servitude, “free subjects” have the power to resist, and that resistance, a force of antimodernity, is key to understanding the movements of modern history.” 76-77

FOUCAULT—POWER IS EXERCISED ONLY OVER FREE SUBJECTS

“We should not think of power as primary and resistance a reaction to it; instead, paradoxical as it may sound, resistance is prior to power. Here we can appreciate the full importance of Foucault’s claim that power is exercised only over free subjects. Their freedom is prior to the exercise of power, and their resistance is simply the effort to further, expand, and strengthen that freedom. And in this context the dream of an outside, an external standpoint or support for resistance, is both futile and disempowering.” 81-82

MARX’S EVOLVING POSITION ON PROPERTY AND PRE-MODERNITY

“In the last years of his life, the second half of the 1870s, after having worked for decades on *Capital* and throwing himself headlong into the project to create a communist International, Marx becomes interested in pre- or noncapitalist forms of property and starts reading some of the founders of modern anthropology and sociology, such as Lewis Morgan, Maksim Kovalevsky, John Phear, Henry Maine, John Lubbock, and Georg Ludwig Maurer. He develops a hypothesis that bourgeois private property is only one form of property among many others that exist in parallel, and that the rules of capitalist property are acquired only through a brutal and complex disciplinary training. He thus completely overturns the rigid theory of “precapitalist forms” that he developed in the 1850s: he draws into question the claim that economic laws act independently of historical and social circumstances and extends his perspective somewhat beyond the Eurocentric limit of his earlier views, subordinating the history of Europe to the standpoint of the entire globe, which contains within it radical differences.” 87-88

“Marx’s break with his earlier assumptions of modern “progress” seems to be consolidated when he receives a request in the late 1870s to adjudicate between two groups of Russian revolutionaries: one side, citing Marx’s own work, insists that capitalism has to be developed in Russia before the struggle for communism can begin; and the other side sees in the *mir*, the Russian peasant commune, an already existing basis for communism. Marx finds himself in an awkward position here because, whereas his major writings support the former position, his current thinking agrees with the latter.” 88

“The historical necessity of the destruction of communal property in western Europe that Marx describes in *Capital* is not, be explains in another letter of this period, a universal history that immediately applies to Russia or anywhere else. It is a mistake to “metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historical-philosophical theory of general development, imposed by fate on all peoples, whatever the historical circumstances in which they are placed.” In Russia, in fact, the task of the revolution is to halt the “progressive” developments of capital that threaten the Russian commune.” 88

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST STATES AND THEIR ECONOMIC PROGRAMS 89

ALTERMODERNITY

“A similar terminological move allows us to displace the terrain of discussions about modernity and antimodernity. *Altermodernity* has a diagonal relationship with modernity. It marks conflict with modernity’s hierarchies as much as does antimodernity but orients the forces of resistance more clearly toward an autonomous terrain.” 102

SOCIALISM, COMMUNISM, ALTERMODERNITY

“Altermodernity thus involves not only insertion in the long history of antimodern struggles but also rupture with any fixed dialectic between modern sovereignty and antimodern resistance. In the passage from antimodernity to altermodernity, just as tradition and identity are transformed, so too resistance takes on a new meaning, dedicated now to the constitution of alternatives. The freedom that forms the base of resistance, as we explained earlier, comes to the fore and constitutes an event to announce a new political project. This conception of altermodernity gives us a preliminary way to pose the distinction between socialism and communism: whereas socialism ambivalently straddles modernity and antimodernity, communism must break with both of these by presenting a direct relation to the common to develop the paths of altermodernity.” 106-107

MULTITUDE—VAST MULTIPLICITIES OF SINGULARITIES

“Multitude is thus a concept of applied parallelism, able to grasp the specificity of altermodern struggles, which are characterized by relations of autonomy, equality, and interdependence among vast multiplicities of singularities. In the Bolivian struggles, as in so many others like them throughout the world, there is no single figure of labor, such as the miners, that can guide or claim to represent all the workers. Instead miners, industrial workers, peasants, unemployed people, students, domestic workers, and numerous other sectors of labor participate equally in the struggle.” 111

STRUGGLES OF THE MULTITUDE HAVE THEIR BASIS IN THE COMMONS

“The struggles of the Bolivian multitude also demonstrate another essential feature of altermodernity: its basis in the common. In the first place, the central demands of these struggles are explicitly aimed at ensuring that resources, such as water and gas, will not be privatized. The multitude of altermodernity, in this sense, runs counter to the republic of property. Second, and more important, the struggles of the multitude are based in common organizational structures, where the common is seen as not a natural resource but a social product, and this common is an inexhaustible source of innovation and creativity.” 111-112

“This vision of a multitude composed of a set of singularities and based on practices of self-determination and the common is still missing one essential element of altermodernity: its constant metamorphosis, its mixture and movement. Every singularity is a social becoming. What the multitude presents, then, is not only a *sociedad abigarrada* engaged in common struggle but also a society constantly in the process of metamorphosis. Resistance and the collaboration with others, after all, is always a transformative experience. Rather than a static mosaic of many-colored parts, this society is more like a kaleidoscope in which the colors are constantly shifting to form new and more beautiful patterns, even melding together to make new colors.” 112

ALTERMODERNITY AND THE COMMONS

“The task of altermodernity, which is illustrated by some social movements experimenting with the multitude form, is not only to resist and challenge the hierarchical relationships established by modernity and the identities of antimodernity but also to create alternative social relations based on the common.” 113

ALTERMODERNITY—FOCUS IS ON ALTERNATIVES RATHER THAN SIMPLY RESISTANCE

“Altermodernity, in contrast, marks a more profound rupture with modernity than either hype—or postmodernity. In fact it is two removes from modernity since it is first grounded in the struggles of antimodernity and their resistance to the hierarchies at the core of modernity; and second it breaks with antimodernity, refusing the dialectical opposition and moving from resistance to the proposition of alternatives. There is no faith here that the core principles of modernity can be reformed and perfected as there is for the proponents of hypermodernity. The struggles of antimodernity have long ago washed away any residue of those illusions. And in contrast to most propositions of postmodernity, altermodernity provides a strong notion of new values, new knowledges, and new practices; in short, altermodernity constitutes a *dispositif* for the production of subjectivity.” 114-115

SOCIAL PRACTICE OF COMMONS AND TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE

“Normal usage of the terms “common sense” and “common knowledge” captures some of what we have in mind insofar as they extend beyond the limitations of the particular and grasp a certain social generality, but these terms generally view the common as something passive, already given in society. We concentrate instead, following Spinoza’s conception of “common notions,” on the *production and productivity* of the common through collective social practices. Like the universal, the common lays claim to truth, but rather than descending from above, this truth is constructed from below. This leads directly to our second guiding intuition: that epistemology has to be grounded on the terrain of struggle—struggle that not only drives the critique of the present reality of domination but also animates the constitution of another reality. Saying that truth is constructed from below means that it is forged through resistance and practices of the common.” 120-121

COMMONS AS AFFIRMATION OF SINGULARITIES

“When we place so much weight on the common, as we do here, some are likely to object that this amounts to an assumption of sameness or identity that denies or negates difference. We should emphasize, on the contrary, that when the common appears in the thought of Wittgenstein or Viveiros de Castro, it brings with it an affirmation of singularities.” 124

“Differences in perspective mark differences over not only opinions or principles but also what world we inhabit—or really they indicate that we inhabit different worlds. And yet every world is defined by becomings, constantly engaged with alterity. Whereas identity and difference stand in opposition, the common and singularity are not just compatible but mutually constitutive.” 124-125

BIOPOLITICS AND THE ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH AT THE SERVICE OF THE COMMON

“That makes it clear (to move now through the same three items in inverse order) that economic valorization is no longer possible except on the basis of the social appropriation of common goods; that the reproduction of the lifeworld and its physical environments is no longer possible except when technologies are directly controlled by the project of the common; and that rationality can no longer function except as an instrument of the common freedom of the multitude, as a mechanism for the institution of the common.” 125

“All of this remains lifeless and inert, however, unless biopolitical reason is grounded on the terrain of collective practice, where the state of being-in-common is transformed into a process of making the common.” 125

CAPITALIST PRODUCTION IS BECOMING BIOPOLITICAL

“Economic production is going through a period of transition in which increasingly the results of capitalist production are social relations and forms of life.” 131

PROPERTY, BIOPOLITICS, SOCIAL RELATIONS, AND REPRODUCTION

“These three major trends pose significant challenges to traditional concepts and methods of political economy in large part because the biopolitical production shifts the economic center of gravity from the production of material commodities to that of social relations, confusing, as we said, the division between production and reproduction. Intangible values and intangible assets, as economists call them, pose a problem because the methods of economic analysis generally rely on quantitative measures and calculate the value of objects that can be counted, such as cars, computers, and tons of wheat. The critique of political economy, too, including the Marxist tradition, has generally focused on measurement and quantitative methods to understand surplus value and exploitation. Biopolitical products, however, tend to *exceed* all quantitative measurement and take *common* forms, which are easily shared and difficult to corral as private property.” 135-136

BIOPOLITICS: MAN PRODUCING MAN—A DANGEROUS NEW SUBJECTIVITY

“Foucault clearly senses (without seeming to understand fully) the explosiveness of this situation: the biopolitical process is not limited to the reproduction of capital as a social relation but also presents the potential for an autonomous process that could destroy capital and create something entirely new. Biopolitical production and the three major trends we have outlined obviously imply new mechanisms of exploitation and capitalist control, and we will explore these in more detail next, but we should keep an eye out from the beginning, following Foucault’s intuition, for how biopolitical production, particularly in the ways it exceeds the bounds of capitalist relations and constantly refers to the common, grants labor increasing autonomy and provides the tools or weapons that could be wielded in a project of liberation.” 136-137

NOW CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION PREMISED ON EXPROPRIATION OF THE COMMONS—IN 2 GUISES

“Capitalist accumulation today is increasingly external to the production process, such that exploitation takes the form of *expropriation of the common*. This shift can be recognized in two primary guises. Scholars who critique neoliberalism often emphasize that increasingly today capitalist accumulation is a predatory operation that functions through dispossession, by transforming into private property both public wealth and wealth held socially in common.” 137

SECOND GUISE OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF THE COMMONS CONT…

“A second guise of the expropriation of the commons, which centers on the exploitation of biopolitical labor, allows us to pursue much better a Marxian investigation of the organic composition of capital. The three major trends of the transformation of the technical composition of labor that we outlined earlier all are engaged in the production of common forms of wealth, such as knowledges, information, images, affects, and social relationships, which are subsequently expropriated by capital to generate surplus value. Note right away that this second guise refers primarily to a different notion of the common than does the first. The first is a relatively inert, traditional notion that generally involves natural resources.” 139

TWO TYPES OF COMMONS AND HOW THE LOGIC OF SCARCITY APPLIES

“The second notion of the common is dynamic, involving both the product of labor and the means of future production. This common is not only the earth we share but also the languages we create, the social practices we establish, the modes of sociality that define our relationships, and so forth. This form of the common does not lend itself to a logic of scarcity as does the first.” 139

“The expropriation of this second form of the common—the artificial common or, really, the common that blurs the division between nature and culture—is the key to understanding the new forms of exploitation of biopolitical labor.” 139

IN BIOPOLITICAL PRODUCTION CAPITALIST DOES NOT DETERMINE THE COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT—IMMATERIAL PRODUCTION AUTONOMOUS FROM CAPITAL

“With reference to large-scale industry, Marx recognizes that the essential role of the capitalist in the production process, which is clearly linked to the mechanisms of exploitation, is to provide cooperation, that is, bring workers together in the factory, give them the tools to work together, furnish a plan to cooperate, and enforce their cooperation. The capitalist ensures cooperation, Marx imagines, like the general on the battlefield or the conductor of the orchestra. In biopolitical production, however, capital does not determine the cooperative arrangement, or at least not to the same extent. Cognitive labor and affective labor generally produce cooperation autonomously from capitalist command, even in some of the most constrained and exploited circumstances, such as call centers or food services. Intellectual, communicative, and affective means of cooperation are generally created in the productive encounters themselves and cannot be directed from the outside. In fact, rather than providing cooperation, we could even say that capital *expropriates cooperation* as a central element of exploiting biopolitical labor-power. This expropriation takes place not so much from the individual worker (because cooperation already implies a collectivity) but more clearly from the field of social labor, operating on the level of information flows, communication networks, social codes, linguistic innovations, and practices of affects and passions. Biopolitical exploitation involves the expropriation of the common, in this way, at the level of social production and social practice.” 140-141

“In other words, biopolitical labor is increasingly autonomous. Capital is predatory, as the analysts of neoliberalism say, insofar as it seeks to capture and expropriate autonomously produced common wealth.” 141

EXPROPRIATION OF THE COMMON BETTER UNDERSTOOD AS RENT, NOT PROFIT 141

BIOPOLITICAL LABOR POWER—CAPITAL INCREASINGLY PARASITIC

“Rather than an organ functioning within the capitalist body, biopolitical labor-power is becoming more and more autonomous, with capital simply hovering over it parasitically with its disciplinary regimes, apparatuses of capture, mechanisms of expropriation, financial networks, and the like.” 142

CURRENT CRISIS PUSHES CAPITAL TO CREATE INSTITUTIONS OF COMMAND

“For a first approximation of the current biopolitical crisis we can return to the three general trends in the transformation of labor we spoke of earlier. Each trend indicates strategies of the capitalist control of labor-power, but in each case we find that the mechanisms of control contradict the productivity of biopolitical labor and obstruct the creation of value, thereby exacerbating the crisis. With regard to the first trend, the development of cognitive, affective, and biopolitical forms of labor, strategies of capitalist command develop intensively and extensively. Intensive strategies primarily divide and segment the common field of productive cooperation, establishing something like command outposts by which private and/or state agencies monitor and regulate social production processes through various techniques of discipline, surveillance, and monitoring. Other intensive strategies drain the common that serves as the basis for biopolitical production, for example, by dismantling institutions of public education through the privatization of primary education and the defunding of secondary education. Extensive strategies are typified by the workings of finance, since it does not directly intervene in the productive networks but spreads over, expropriating and privatizing the common wealth embedded in the accumulated knowledges, codes, images, affective practices, and biopolitical relationships that they produce. Capital’s appropriative processes thus stand opposed to the common that biopolitical labor creates socially.” 145

CAPITALIST CONTRADICTION: EXPLOITING THE COMMONS DESTROYS IT AS A SOURCE OF VALUE—EXAMPLE OF IP VERSUS ACCESS TO FREE FLOWS OF INFORMATION

“Here we run into the first contradiction, because the intensive and extensive strategies of control both destroy the common, the former segmenting or draining the common bases of production and the latter privatizing the common results. The productivity of biopolitical labor is reduced every time the common is destroyed. Consider, for example, the production of scientific knowledge, a very specialized field but one that shares the basic characteristics of the biopolitical production as a whole. For scientific knowledge to be produced, the relevant information, methods, and ideas, which result from past scientific activity, must be open and accessible to a broad scientific community, and there must be highly developed mechanisms of cooperation and circulation among different laboratories and researchers through journals, conferences, and the like. When new knowledge is produced, it too must be made common so that future scientific production can use it as a basis.” 145

THE OPEN SOCIAL RELATION OF CAPITAL

“In the context of biopolitical production we have found that capital should be understood not simply as a social relation but as an *open* social relation. Capital previously has held together within itself labor-power and the command over labor, or in Marxian language, it has been able to construct an organic composition of variable capital (the wage labor force) and constant capital. But today there is a growing rupture within the organic composition of capital, a progressive decomposition of capital in which variable capital (and particularly biopolitical labor-power) is separating from constant capital along with its political forces of command and control. Biopolitical labor tends to generate its own forms of social cooperation and produce value autonomously. In fact the more autonomous the social organization of biopolitical production, the more productive it is. Capital thus has ever more difficulty creating a coherent cycle of production and synthesizing or subsuming labor-power in a process of value creation.” 150

BIOPOLITICAL LABOR POWER EXCEEDS THE BOUNDS SET IN ITS EMPLOYMENT BY CAPITAL—IT IS NOT JUST ACTUALIZED IN A SITE SPECIFIC RELATION WITH CAPITAL

“Labor-power has always exceeded its relation to capital in terms of its potential, in the sense that people have the capacity to do much more and produce much more than what they do at work. In the past, however, the productive process, especially the industrial process, has severely restricted the actualization of the potential that exceeds capital’s bounds. The auto worker, for example, has extraordinary mechanical and technological skills and knowledges, but they are primarily site specific: they can be actualized only in the factory and thus in the relation with capital, aside from some tinkering with the car in the garage at home. The affective and intellectual talents, the capacities to generate cooperation and organizational networks, the communication skills, and the other competences that characterize biopolitical labor, in contrast, are generally not site specific.” 151-152

CLASS STRUGGLE (RESISTANCE) IN THE BIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT TAKES THE FORM OF EXODUS

“At this point we can hazard a first hypothesis: class struggle in the biopolitical context takes the form of exodus. By exodus here we mean, at least initially, a process of *subtraction* from the relationship with capital by means of actualizing the potential autonomy of labor-power. Exodus is thus not a refusal of the productivity of biopolitical labor-power but rather a refusal of the increasingly restrictive fetters placed on its productive capacities by capital. It is an expression of the productive capacities that exceed the relationship with capital achieved by stepping through the opening in the social relation of capital and across the threshold.” 152

CLASS STRUGGLE AS EXODUS—PREMISED ON THE COMMONS

“Class struggle does still, of course, involve resisting capitalist command and attacking the bases of capitalist power, which we will address in more detail later, but it also requires an exodus from the relationship with capital and from capitalist relations of production. And although the requirements for *resistance* are immediately given to workers in the labor relation itself—workers always have the power to say no, to stop providing their labor to capital, and their ability to subvert the production process is constantly present in their very capacity to produce—the requirements for *exodus* are not so evident. Exodus is possible only on the basis of the common—both access to the common and the ability to make use of it—and capitalist society seems driven to eliminate or mask the common by privatizing the means of production and indeed all aspects of social life.” 153

2 DISTINCTIONS OF COMMONS: TRADITIONAL COMMONS VERSUS BIOPOLITICAL COMMONS

“But it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the two notions of the common we cited earlier. Whereas the traditional notion poses the common as a natural world outside of society, the biopolitical conception of the common permeates equally all spheres of life, referring not only to the earth, the air, the elements, or even plant and animal life but also to the constitutive elements of human society, such as common languages, habits, gestures, affects, codes, and so forth. And whereas according to the traditional notion, for thinkers like Locke and Rousseau, the formation of society and the progress of history inevitably destroy the common, fencing it off as private property, the biopolitical conception emphasizes not only preserving the common but also struggling over the conditions of producing it, as well as selecting among its qualities, promoting its beneficial forms, and fleeing its detrimental, corrupt forms.” 171

COMMONS PRODUCES SUBJECTIVITY

“The politics of the production of subjectivity helps us understand better the economic process of the metamorphoses of the common, which we analyzed earlier. The biopolitical production of ideas, codes, images, affects, and social relationships directly treats the constituent elements of human subjectivity: this terrain is precisely where subjectivity is born and resides. One might still conceive of economic production as an engagement of the subject with nature, a transformation of the object through labor, but increasingly the “nature” that biopolitical labor transforms is subjectivity itself.” 172

MULTITUDE IS A CONSTANT STATE OF METAMORPHOSIS GROUNDED IN THE COMMON

“Biopolitical production takes place and can only take place on the terrain of the common. Ideas, images, and codes are produced not by a lone genius or even by a master with supporting apprentices but by a wide network of cooperating producers.” 173

BASED IN THE COMMONS, THE MULTITUDE ALWAYS EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF POWER—NETWORKS OF COLLABORATION THAT, ONCE SET IN MOTION, CAN EXTEND INDEFINITELY 176

FORMAL TO REAL SUBSUMPTION AND REAL TO FORMAL SUBSUMPTION 230

“We need, in fact, to recognize a reciprocal movement also under way in the process of globalization, from the real subsumption to the formal, creating not new “outsides” to capital but severe divisions and hierarchies within the capitalist globe. This does not, however, mark a return to the past: movements toward formal and real subsumption coexist in the globalizing capitalist world whose geography is striated by old and new boundaries and cleavages. The return movement from real to formal subsumption corresponds, in certain respects, to the recent reappearance of many antiquated, parasitical forms of capitalist appropriation.” 230

DISASTER CAPITALISM AND ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION 231

INDIGNATION IS THE RAW MATERIAL OF REBELLION

“Let us begin with indignation, then, as the raw material of revolt and rebellion. In indignation, as Spinoza reminds us, we discover our power to act against oppression and challenge the causes of our collective suffering. In the expression of indignation our very existence rebels. Indignation thus includes a certain amount of violence. This relates closely to the fact, which we touched on earlier, that the resistance to power, always involves a dimension of force—when the worker confronts the boss, the colonized faces off against the colonizer, the citizen the state, and so forth.” 236

“The force and resistance that arise from indignation against the abuses and dictates of power, however, can appear immediate or spontaneous and thus naïve (though not for that reason any less powerful). Indignation is born always as a singular phenomenon, in response to a specific obstacle or violation. Is it possible, then, for there to be a *strategy* of indignation? Can indignation lead to a process of political self-determination?” 236

CRITICS CHARGE THAT SPONTANEITY OF REBELLIONS LEAVES BEHIND NO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 237

REVOLUTIONARY ACTION MUST BE THEORIZED ON BIOPOLITICAL HORIZON—NOT JUST IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION

“Often in our analyses, in this book and others, we focus on the rupture of the constituted order enacted by the refusal of relations of production by the producers and their organization of the material conditions of overturning them. Indeed the Marxist and communist revolutionary traditions, which constitute one of the primary points of departure for our work, understand the revolutionary process as taking place primarily within the field of economic production. Today, even for those who want to remain part of these traditions, the perspective of revolutionary action has to be conceived much more broadly, on the biopolitical horizon.” 239

“As we insisted at length in Part 3, the sites of economic production have spread throughout the social terrain, and the production of economic value is increasingly indistinguishable from the production of social relations and forms of life. A worker revolution is no longer sufficient; a revolution in life, of life, is needed.” 239

EXODUS—REJECTION OF A SOCIETAL TOTALITY—NOT DIRECTED AT A PARTICULAR CAPITALIST

“Today, in the context of biopolitical production, when the factory is no longer the primary site of the production of capital, this imaginary continues, but transformed: the proletariat is within society as a whole and produces there; and it is against the same social totality. This marks another anthropological condition of politics and revolt. The refusal of exploitation and alienation now more clearly is directed against the society of capital in its entirety and thus designates a process of exodus, a kind of anthropological (and ontological) separation from the domination of capital.” 241

THE METROPOLIS IS TO THE MULTITUDE WHAT THE FACTORY WAS TO THE PROLETARIAT

“The factory constituted in the previous era the primary site and posed the conditions for three central activities of the industrial working class: its production; its internal encounters and organization; and its expressions of antagonism and rebellion. The contemporary productive activities of the multitude, however, overflow the factory walls to permeate the entire metropolis, and in the process the qualities and potential of those activities are transformed fundamentally.” 250

“With the passage to the hegemony of biopolitical production, the space of economic production and the space of the city tend to overlap. There is no longer a factory wall that divides the one from the other, and “externalities” are no longer external to the site of production that valorizes them. Workers produce throughout the metropolis, in its every crack and crevice. In fact, production of the common is becoming nothing but the life of the city itself.” 251

THERE HAS BEEN A METROPOLITIZATION OF THE WORLD—RURAL LIFE NO LONGER IMPLIES SOCIAL ISOLATION 253

NEOLIBERALISM HAS REDISTRIBUTED RATHER THAN GENERATE NEW WEALTH—FEEDING OFF THE CORPOSE OF SOCIALISM 266

IMMATERIAL LABOR UNDERMINES CAPITALIST CONTROL

“In industrial capitalism knowledge remained a fundamental force of development, but increasingly, as the industrial paradigm took shape, its importance was not so much as an internal element, incarnated in the practice of workers and consolidated in their skills and know-how, but rather as an external one, independent of the workers and thus capable of controlling them. As industrial capitalism matured, knowledge became fundamental but completely absorbed within the system of command. In today’s economy, in contrast, knowledge that is widespread across society—mass intellectuality—is becoming a central productive force, out of reach of the system of control, and this shift undermines the industrial paradigm.” 267

“Production, in other words, is becoming “anthropogenetic,” generating forms of life. From this trajectory of knowledge within economic production, two important facts follow. First, knowledge is no longer merely a means to the creation of value (in the commodity form), but rather the production of knowledge is itself value creation. Second, not only is this knowledge no longer a weapon of capitalist control, but also capital is in fact confronted with a paradoxical situation: the more it is forced to pursue valorization through knowledge production, the more that knowledge escapes its control.” 267-268

SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM WERE NEVER OPPOSITES 268

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

“In standard journalistic usage today communism is likely to be used to mean centralized state control of the economy and society, a totalitarian form of government parallel to fascism.” 273

“At a purely conceptual level we could begin to define communism this way: what the private is to capitalism and what the public is to socialism, the common is to communism.” 273

COMMONS IS NEITHER CAPITALIST NOR STATE

“The key to understanding economic production today is the common, both as productive force and as the form in which wealth is produced. But private property has made us stupid, as Marx says, so stupid that we are blind to the common! It seems that economists and politicians can only see the world as divided between private and public, either owned by capitalists or controlled by the state, as if the common did not exist. Economists do recognize the common, in fact, but cast it generally outside of properly economic relations, as “external economies” or simply “externalities.” In order to understand biopolitical production, however, we need to invert this perspective and *internalize the productive externalities*, bringing the common to the center of economic life. The standpoint of the common reveals how, increasingly in the course of the present transition, the process of economic valorization become ever more internal to the structures of social life.” 280

EXTERNALITIES VERSUS THE COMMONS—“MISSING MARKETS”

“The question gets all the more interesting when economists, realizing they can no longer just ignore all that is external to the market, go on the offensive against it. External economies, according to some economists, are “missing markets” or even indications of “market failures.” Nothing should be outside the market, and no productive goods should be “unowned,” these economists maintain, because such externalities would escape the mechanisms of efficiency imposed by the market.” 281

COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE AS PRIVATE PROPERTY MANAGED BY STATE OR CAPITAL—COMMON EXISTS ON DIFFERENT PLANE FROM PUBLIC OR PRIVATE

“The conflict of the common with private property is most often the focus of attention: patents and copyrights are the two mechanisms for making knowledge into private property that have played the most prominent roles in recent years. The relationship of the common to the public is equally significant but often obscured. It is important to keep conceptually separate the common—such as common knowledge and culture—and the public, institutional arrangements that attempt to regulate access to it. It is thus tempting to think of the relationships among the private, the public, and the common as triangular, but that too easily gives the impression that the three could constitute a closed system with the common between the other two. Instead the common exists on a different plane from the private and the public, and is fundamentally autonomous from both.” 282

IN NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMON IS IMPERATIVE

“In the realm of the information economy and knowledge production it is quite clear that freedom of the common is essential for production. As Internet and software practitioners and scholars often point out, access to the common in the network environment—common knowledges, common codes, common communications circuits—is essential for creativity and growth. The privatization of knowledge and code through intellectual property rights, they argue, thwarts production and innovation by destroying the freedom of the common. It is important to see that from the standpoint of the common, the standard narrative of economic freedom is completely inverted. According to that narrative, private property is the locus of freedom (as well as efficiency, discipline, and innovation) that stands against *public* control. Now instead the common is the locus of freedom and innovation—free access, free use, free expression, free interaction—that stands against *private* control, that is, the control exerted by private property, its legal structures, and its market forces. Freedom in this context can only be freedom of the common.” 282

COMMON IS BEING INTERNALIZED AS FORM OF ECONOMIC PRODUCTION—INVERTING THE “MISSING MARKET”

“In the age of biopolitical production, the common, which previously was cast as external, is becoming completely “internalized.” The common, in other words, in both its natural and artificial forms, is becoming the central and essential element in all sectors of economic production. Rather than seeing the common in the form of externalities as “missing markets” or “market failures,” then, we should instead see private property in terms of the “missing common” and “common failures.”” 283

BIOPOLITICAL PRODUCTION IS NOT CONSTRAINED BY THE LOGIC OF SCARCITY 283

THERE ARE DETRIMENTAL AND BENEFICIAL FORMS OF THE COMMONS 284

FORM OF CRISIS: SURVEILLANCE AND POLICE STATE CONTROLS UNDERMINE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF BIOPOLITICAL PRODUCTION

“Security measures, imprisonment, social monitoring, eroding the basic set of civil and human rights, and all the rest that comes with the war society might in the short run augment control, but it also undermines productivity, most dramatically in the biopolitical economy, where freedom, communication, and social interaction are essential.” 288-289

“The productivity of biopolitical labor requires autonomy to determine its own movements and transformation; it requires the freedom to construct productive encounters, form networks of cooperation, subtract itself from detrimental relationships, and so forth.” 290

THE REPUBLIC OF PROPERTY NO LONGER SERVES CAPITAL WELL—IT IS INSTEAD A FETTER ON PRODUCTION 301

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IDENTITY POLITICS OF WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE—TRYING TO DESTROY ITSELF AS A CLASS AS MUCH AS IT TRIES TO DESTROY CAPITAL

“This communist proposition is not as paradoxical as it first appears, since revolutionary workers aim to destroy not themselves but the identity that defines them as workers. The primary object of class struggle, in other words, is not to kill capitalists but to demolish the social structures and institutions that maintain their privilege and authority, abolishing too, thereby, the conditions of proletarian subordination.” 332

THIS FORMULATION HELPS DISTINGUISH REVOLUTIONARY AND NONREVOLUTIONARY FORMS OF CLASS STRUGGLE

“Revolutionary politics are not aimed only at the amelioration of worker conditions within capitalist social structures. By attaining better work conditions, higher wages, enhanced social services, greater representation in government, and other reforms, workers can achieve recognition and perhaps even emancipation but only by preserving their identity *as workers*. Revolutionary class politics must destroy the structures and institutions of worker subordination and thus abolish the identity of workers itself, setting in motion the production of subjectivity and a process of social and institutional innovation.” 333

IDENTITY VERSUS SINGULARITY 339

SOME ARGUE THAT CLASS POLITICS ARE SUPERIOR TO RACE OR GENDER BECAUSE RATHER THAN REIFY THE IDENTITY, CLASS STRUGGLE SEEKS TO ABOLISH THE IDENTITY THRUST UPON IT—MUST NOT GET STUCK ON IDENTITY

“We agree with Žižek’s primary critique to the extent that it poses the danger we cited earlier that identity struggles become attached to identity as property and fail to engage a process of liberation. Žižek is wrong, however, to assume that class struggles are necessarily different from antiracist and antisexist struggles in this way. We have seen all too many forms of class politics that get stuck on identity, affirming worker identity and celebrating work. More important, through, Žižek fails to recognize the revolutionary forms of gender and race politics: just as revolutionary class struggle aims at the annihilation not of all bourgeois people but of their “sociopolitical role and function” (along with, we would add, the sociopolitical role and function of the worker), so too revolutionary feminist and antiracist politics attack not only sexists and racists, or even patriarchy and white supremacy, but the bases of gender and race identities as well.” 342

STATE AS A TERRAIN OF STRUGGLE

“Governance, of course, serves to maintain the ruling powers and support the interests of capital, but it never succeeds in solving the crisis and bringing it to an end. In fact processes of negotiation and struggle are constantly reopened on the terrain of governance. In some respects, then, governance is analogous to the old terrain of trade union struggles, and indeed, some authors propose confronting the current forms of governance with the models of negotiation and agreement of labor law. When the old labor leaders used to say, “There is no end to negotiations,” they never questioned the ultimate hegemony of capital but still appreciated the importance of the struggle. We should not underestimate the fact that governance is an open space of conflict and struggle between (sovereign) powers and (social) counterpowers.” 348

EXODUS AS REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

“In fact our estimation is that increasingly today a “disarmed multitude” is much more effective than an armed band and that exodus is more powerful than frontal assault. Exodus in this context often takes the form of sabotage, withdrawal from collaboration, countercultural practices, and generalized disobedience. Such practices are effective because biopower is always “subject” to the subjectivities it rules over.” 368